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CHAPTER 8

Social Security Reform in 2005 and Beyond
KATHRYN L. MOORE
Kathryn L. Moore is the Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law at the
University of Kentucky College of Law. She would like to thank Alvin D. Lurie,
Esq. for his comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
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§ 8.01

INTRODUCTION

Social Security reform started with a bang in 2005. President
Bush placed it at the top of his domestic agenda 1 and featured it
prominently in his 2005 State of the Union Address. 2 The President
1 Cf. Edwin Chen and Joel Havemann, Social Security plan withering, Bush says:
Cites more urgent needs of Gulf area, Lexington Herald-Leader A-8 (Oct. 5, 2005)
(noting that restructuring Social Security was once Bush’s top second-term
domestic priority).
2 See “We Must Pass Reforms that Solve the Financial Problems of Social Security,” New York Times A22 (Feb. 3, 2005) (transcript of President Bush’s State
of the Union address as recorded by the New York Times).
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spent the early months of the year on a “60-day, 60 city tour” of
the country touting his pet project, amending Social Security to
create “personal retirement accounts.” 3 Indeed, there was so much
activity in the arena that the BNA Pension and Benefits Reporter
frequently devoted a separate section to Social Security news in
2005. 4
Despite its early prominence, Social Security reform ended with
a whimper by the end of 2005. By October, President Bush
acknowledged at a news conference that his proposed Social
Security overhaul was going nowhere. “There seems to be a
diminished appetite in the short term, but I’m going to remind
people that there is a long-term issue that we must solve,” he said. 5
What happened to this hot button issue in 2005? This Article
begins by describing and analyzing three of the most politically
salient reform proposals in 2005. It then explains why Social
Security reform failed despite President Bush’s Herculean effort to
partially privatize the system. 6 Finally, it concludes by discussing
the prospects for reform in 2006 and beyond.
3

See William Douglas, et al., Bush’s second-term blues: The President’s aggressive agenda is bogged down, Phila. Inquirer A01 (April 25, 2005) (“Unable
to convince Americans that Social Security was in crisis, White House officials
embarked on a 60-day, 60-city tour to explain the situation and tout Bush’s proposal
for private investments.”); Glen Johnson, Democrats shift aim to savings proposals;
After denouncing Bush plan, lawmakers want to give an alternative, Charlotte
Observer 9A (April 26, 2005) (“The Democratic shift also comes as Bush winds
down a 60-day, 60-city tour aimed at building support for his proposal, a drive
he kicked off on March 3.”).
4 See, e.g., 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. No. 30 (Aug. 2, 2005); 32 BNA Pens.
& Bene. Rptr. No. 28 (July 19, 2005); 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. No. 26 (July
5, 2005).
5 Alex Wayne and Martha Angle, Bush sees less appetite for Social Security
Overhaul; Lawmakers point to Menu, Congressional Quarterly Today 12 (Oct. 4,
2005).
6 Of course, President Bush never referred to his proposal as “partial privatization” of Social Security. The term “partial privatization” came out of political favor
in the late 1990s, but the substance of President Bush’s proposal was identical
to what used to be referred to as “partial privatization.” See Kathryn L. Moore,
President Bush’s Personal Retirement Accounts: Saving or Dismantling Social
Security?, NYU Rev. Of Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation 5-1,
5-24 nn. 113–15 (2005), and accompanying text.
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§ 8.02

§ 8.02[1]

PRINCIPAL REFORM PROPOSALS

[1] President Bush’s “Personal Retirement Accounts”
The first, and most prominent, reform proposal in 2005 was
President Bush’s proposal to create “personal retirement accounts.”
It was featured prominently in his 2005 State of the Union Address,
and he spent the early months of the year traveling throughout the
country to promote his proposal. Indeed, as late as July 2005, he
was adamant that any Social Security reform include individual
accounts. 7
In Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, 8 a document posted on the White House website in February 2005,
President Bush proposed that workers be permitted the option of
gradually investing up to 4 percentage points of their Social Security
payroll taxes into individual accounts. 9 Contributions would be
capped at $1,000 in 2009, and increase by $100 plus wage inflation
each year, until they reached 4 percent of taxable wages by 2041. 10
Beginning in 2009, workers born between 1950 and 1965 would
be permitted to contribute to the accounts, and by 2011, all workers
born before 1950 would be eligible to contribute to the accounts. 11
Unless a worker and his or her spouse elected otherwise, once a
worker reached 47, the worker’s account would be invested in a
“life cycle portfolio;” that is, a portfolio which would gradually and
automatically reduce the percentage of the portfolio invested in
7

See also Elizabeth White and Heather M. Rothman, Thomas Floats Ideas for
Making Annuities More Flexible, Attractive Planning Vehicles, BNA Pens. & Bene.
Rptr. 1369, 1369 (June 21, 2005) (On June 14, President Bush said, “I’m going
to continue working this issue, state after state. I’m going to continue to call upon
the United States Congress, members of both political parties, to stand up, to do
what’s right for a young generation of Americans coming up, to fix this Social
Security system once and for all.”).
8 Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century 5 (Feb. 2005), available
at
www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/200501/strengtheningsocialsecurity.html.
9 Id.
10 Id. The President’s proposal does not state when the permissible contributions
would reach 4 percentage points, but an analysis of the proposal by the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities states that they would reach that level by 2041.
Jason Furman, The Impact of the President’s Proposal on Social Security Solvency
and the Budget 5 (July 22, 2005), available at www.cbpp.org/5-10-05socsec.htm.
11 Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, supra note 8, at 8.
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stocks as the worker ages. 12 Workers who elected to contribute to
individual accounts would have their traditional Social Security
benefits reduced by their contributions to the account plus an
interest rate charge equal to 2.7 percent above the inflation rate. 13
In introducing the proposal, President Bush offers three justifications for the accounts: (1) they would “provide ownership and
control;” (2) they “could be passed on to children and grandchildren;” and (3) they would “give younger workers the chance to
receive a higher rate of return” than is available under the current
system. 14
Undoubtedly, President Bush’s proposal would “provide ownership and control” and thus advance President Bush’s drive for an
ownership society. 15 Providing ownership and control, however,
is not one of the goals of the current Social Security system. 16
Rather, as I explained in my contribution to the 2005 edition of
this Review, the current Social Security system is a system of social
12

Id. The Vanguard Total Retirement 2045 Fund is an example of a life cycle
account. As the name suggests, it is targeted toward an individual retiring in 2045.
Initially, the fund invests almost completely in stocks, but is designed to gradually
and automatically shift to almost all bonds by 2045. Andrew J. Rettenmaier and
Zijun Wang, Social Security Reform: Responding to the Critics, National Center
for Policy Analysis Report No. 281, at n.5 (Nov. 2005), available at www.ncpa.org/
pub/st/st281.
13 The President’s ten page proposal designed for public consumption does not
mention the offset. Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, supra note
8, at 8 (Feb. 2005). A study by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, however,
notes that the offset rate was originally set at 3.0 percent above the inflation rate
but later was reduced to 2.7 percent. Furman, supra note 10, at 5.
14 Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, supra note 8, at 5.
15 Grover Norquist, a Republican party strategist and president of the Americans
for Tax Reform, contends that creating individual accounts would “‘permanently
create a Republican majority’ by increasing the size of the investor class from
roughly 60 percent of the U.S. population to 100 percent.” Senate Finance Panel
Plans Hearing As GOP Strategizes to Engage Democrats, 32 BNA Pens. & Bene.
Rptr. 829, 830 (April 12, 2005).
16 Of course, critics of the current system, such as the Cato Institute, contend
that “the real problem [with the current system] is that Americans have no
ownership rights to their benefits,” and that the current system should amended
to promote ownership and control. New Cato Radio Advertisements Aim To Shift
Gears in Debate Over Accounts, 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 834, 834 (April
12, 2005) (discussing Cato Institute’s radio ad campaign in favor of private
accounts).
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insurance whose essential purpose “is to prevent hardship, poverty,
or dependence that might be caused by contingencies covered
wherever and whenever these might occur among workers able to
join their employers and the government in a national program.” 17
Amending Social Security to provide ownership and control would
not strengthen the current system; rather it would fundamentally
restructure the system as the first step toward dismantling it. 18
In many ways, President Bush’s second justification for his
personal retirement accounts, that “they could be passed on to
children and grandchildren,” is closely related to his first justification, that they would “provide ownership and control.” Indeed, the
Cato Institute, a staunch critic of the current Social Security system
and proponent of individual accounts, has argued that the Social
Security debate “should be about ownership and inheritability of
retirement assets,” rather than solvency. 19
As a social insurance system, the current Social Security system
does not create inheritable wealth. This is not to suggest, however,
that the system does not provide any protection for the survivors
of deceased workers. Since 1939, 20 the American Social Security
system has provided benefits for the surviving spouses, 21 dependent
children, 22 and dependent parents 23 of deceased workers. Indeed,
in December 2004, over 6.5 million individuals received Social
Security benefits as the surviving spouse, 24 dependent child, 25 or
17

Moore, supra note 6, at 5-23, quoting J. Douglas Brown, Essays on Social
Security 57–58 (1977).
18 Id. at 5-22–5-25. See also Paul Krugman, Social Security Lessons, NY Times
(Aug. 15, 2005) (“In fact, Mr. Bush came to bury Social Security. Over time, the
Bush plan would have transformed Social Security from a social insurance program
into a mutual fund, with nothing except a name in common with the system F.D.R.
created.”).
19 New Cato Radio Advertisements Aim To Shift Gears in Debate Over Accounts,
32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 834, 834 (April 12, 2005) (discussing Cato Institute’s
radio ad campaign in favor of private accounts).
20 See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, Secs.
202(c)–(f), 53 Stat. 1360, 1362–66 (1939).
21 42 U.S.C. Secs. 402(e)–(g).
22 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d).
23 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(h).
24 Over 4.5 million of the beneficiaries were surviving spouses. Social Security
Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement Table 5.A1 (2005) (noting that there
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dependent parent 26 of a deceased worker. 27 Generally, surviving
spouses are entitled to a benefit equal to 100 percent of the deceased
worker’s benefit, 28 while surviving children are entitled to a benefit
equal to 75 percent of the deceased worker’s benefit, 29 and
surviving parents are entitled to a benefit equal to 82 1/2 percent
of the deceased worker’s benefit. 30 In December 2004, the average
survivors’ benefit was $820, with nondisabled surviving spouses
receiving an average benefit of $920, 31 surviving children receiving
an average benefit of $625, and surviving parents receiving an
average benefit of $830. 32
President Bush claims that “[p]ermitting individuals to pass on
their retirement accounts to loved ones [may be] particularly
beneficial to widows, widowers, and other survivors.” 33 It is not
clear, however, that amending the Social Security system to create
inheritable personal accounts would result in survivors receiving
greater benefits than they would receive under the current Social
Security system. President Bush’s proposal would reduce the
traditional Social Security benefits of workers who elect to defer
contributions to personal accounts by their contributions to the
account plus an interest rate charge equal to 2.7 percent above the
inflation rate. 34 Assuming survivor benefits would also be subject
to this benefit offset, 35 it is far from certain that survivors would
were 4,431,020 nondisabled widow(ers), 209,700 disabled widow(ers), and
182,900 widowed mothers and fathers in December 2004).
25 Over 1.9 million of the beneficiaries were surviving dependent children. Id.
26 Only 2,030 of the beneficiaries were surviving dependent parents. Id.
27 Id.
28 42 U.S.C. Secs. 402(e)(2)(A), 402(f)(3)(A). The benefit for a surviving spouse
of deceased workers under the age of 60 and caring for the deceased worker’s
eligible children is generally equal to 75 percent of the deceased worker’s benefit.
42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(g)(2).
29 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d)(2).
30 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(h)(2)(A).
31 Disabled surviving spouses received an average benefit of $582, and widowed
mothers and fathers (that is, surviving spouses of deceased workers under the age
of 60 and caring for the deceased worker’s eligible children) received an average
benefit of $687. Social Security Administration, supra note 24, at Table 5.A1.
32 Id.
33 Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, supra note 8, at 5.
34 See note 13, supra.
35 It is not clear whether the benefit offset would apply to survivors’ benefits

07/13/06 (10:51)
44

24/24

0007

VERSACOMP (4.2 ) – COMPOSE2 (4.43)
PUB 500--NYU Inst. on Federal Taxation 2nd pass
J:\VRS\DAT\00500\8.GML --- r500.sty --CTP READY-- v2.2 4/26 --- POST

8–7

SOCIAL SECURITY

§ 8.02[1]

inherit sufficient benefits from workers’ retirement accounts to
make up for the benefit offset.
In Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, the
President declares that “according to the non-partisan analysis by
the Social Security Administration’s Office of Retirement Policy,
the ability to inherit personal accounts provides the largest gains
to widows and other survivors.” 36 He does not, however, cite a
specific study, and I am not aware of any study by the Social
Security Administration or anyone else that clearly establishes that
surviving spouses, children, and parents would be better off under
a system of individual accounts than under the current Social
Security system. 37 Indeed, as a comprehensive study of individual
accounts by the National Academy of Social of Insurance notes,
“Amid all the work on creating individual Social Security accounts
for retirees, policymakers have paid less attention to individuals
whose eligibility for Social Security benefits is based on family
relationships or disability.” 38
Finally, although personal accounts might “give younger workers
the chance to receive a higher rate of return” than is available under
the current system, 39 as I explained in my contribution to the 2005
edition of this Review, (1) it is not appropriate to compare rates
under President Bush’s plan. See William E. Spriggs, Children Get Social Security,
Too, 14 Poverty & Race 1, 2 (No. 2 March/April 2005) (“[U]nder the Bush plan,
the private accounts are a loan against the worker’s retirement benefit, which must
be paid out of the Social Security retirement benefit with interest, calculated at
3% above inflation — last year, 6.2% interest. It is unclear whether the loan would
have to be repaid out of survivor or disability benefits.”). It would, of course, be
possible to structure the plan so that survivors’ benefits were not subject to the
offset. Cf. National Academy of Social Insurance, Uncharted Waters: Paying
Benefits From Individual Accounts in Federal Retirement Policy 160 (2005)
(noting that it would be possible to calculate benefits for young survivor families
differently than from the method used to calculate benefits for retirees to shield
young survivor families from benefit reductions).
36 Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, supra note 8, at 5.
37 Cf. Spriggs, supra note 35, at 11 (“The benefits of children are greatly threatened by changing the focus of the program — from assuring American parents
that their children will be protected from economic calamity if the parent becomes
disabled, dies or lives long enough to avoid being a burden on their children —
to being solely an individual savings vehicle for retirement.”).
38 National Academy of Social Insurance, supra note 35, at 117.
39 Strengthening Social Security, supra note 8, at 5.
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of return under the current system with rates of return on equity
investments, 40 (2) personal accounts would not guarantee younger
workers a higher rate of return, 41 and (3) investing Social Security
contributions in the private equities market does not require the
creation of personal accounts. 42
[2] Robert Pozen’s Progressive Price Indexing Plan
A second Social Security reform proposal to receive considerable
attention in 2005 was a “progressive price indexing” proposal
introduced by Robert Pozen, an investment executive and member
of President Bush’s 2001 Commission to Strengthen Social Security. 43 President Bush has endorsed the proposal. 44
Under this proposal, initial benefits for low-wage workers would
be wage indexed while benefits for high-wage workers would be
40 See also Jason Furman, Would Private Accounts Provide a Higher Rate of
Return Than Social Security (June 2, 2005), available at www.cbpp.org/6-02-05htm
(explaining why rates of return under Social Security should not be compared with
rates of return in private capital markets).
41 In March 2005, Yale economist Robert Shiller released a study of private
accounts invested in life cycle portfolios. Using actual historical stock returns
dating back to 1871, Shiller found that 32 percent of the time a life cycle portfolio
would produce returns below the 3.0 percent then assumed for the benefit offset.
In addition, using a lower rate of return to reflect reduced expectations about future
returns, Shiller found that 71 percent of the life cycle portfolios would fall below
the then-proposed 3.0 percent break-even point. Robert Shiller, The Life-Cycle
Personal Accounts Proposal for Social Security: An Evaluation (March 2005),
available at www.irrationlaexuberance.com/ShillerSocSec.doc.
42 Moore, supra note 6, at 5-11–5-20.
43 Pozen’s progressive price indexing plan is part of a broader proposal that
includes individual investment accounts. Stephen C. Goss, Estimated Financial
Effects of a Comprehensive Social Security Reform Proposal Including Progressive
Price Indexing — INFORMATION, Social Security Administration Memorandum
to Bob Pozen 2 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/
RPozen_20050210.pdf (describing Pozen plan). The plan, however, can stand on
its own and need not be linked with private accounts. See Statement of Robert
C. Pozen, Chairman, MFS Investment Management, Boston, Mass., Hearings on
Alternatives to Strengthen Social Security, Hearing Before the House Ways and
Means Committee, Serial 109-22, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 12, 2005), available
at waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode4view&id43203.
44 Elizabeth White, Bush Again Calls for Private Accounts, Endorses “Progressive Price Indexing,” 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 1008, 1008 (May 3, 2005)
(noting that Bush endorsed progressive price indexing in “a nationally televised
news conference” on April 28, 2005).
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price indexed and benefits for average-wage workers would be
partially wage-indexed and partially price indexed. The proposal
has the potential to reduce significantly Social Security’s long-term
funding deficit. 45 Moreover, the proposal would protect the benefits
of low-wage workers. 46 Of course, the proposal would not be
costless. It would reduce the benefits of high-wage and averagewage workers, and if retained for a long enough period of time,
could effectively eliminate Social Security’s progressive benefit
formula and result in all workers receiving the same level of
benefits. 47
[a] Calculating Benefits Under the Current Social Security System
The current Social Security system uses a method of wageindexing to calculate initial benefits. Specifically, earnings are
indexed by multiplying each year’s wage by an indexing factor
equal to the ratio of the average national wage in the year the worker
turns 60 to the average national wage in the year to be indexed. 48
For administrative ease, wages earned at age 60 or later are left
at their nominal values in the indexing process. 49 Average adjusted
earnings, or “average indexed monthly earnings” (“AIME”), are
then calculated by taking the best 35 years of earnings adjusted for
past wage inflation, adding them together and dividing them by 420
(the number of months in 35 years). 50
45

See n. 80 infra and accompanying text.
Alicia Munnell and Mauricio Soto, What is Progressive Price Indexing?, Boston College Center for Retirement Research Just the Facts on Retirement Issues
4 (No. 17 April 2005) (“Progressive price indexing has the advantage of protecting
the benefits of low earnings workers. These workers would be assured of receiving
the same amount relative to previous earnings as they do today.”).
47 Patrick Purcell, “Progressive Price Indexing” of Social Security Benefits, Congressional Research Service Memorandum CRS-10 (April 22, 2005) (“Under the
method of progressive price indexing analyzed by SSA and described in this
memorandum, all workers eventually would be paid the same monthly benefit.
. . . CRS estimates that this would occur approximately 100 years following the
implementation of progressive price indexing as described by SSA, assuming longrun real wage growth of 1.1% per year.”).
48 42 U.S.C. Sec. 415(b)(3).
49 “Earnings are indexed only up to age 60 because it can take up to two years
for the national earnings data on which the wage indexing series is based to become
available.” Purcell, supra note 47, at 2 n.4.
50 42 U.S.C. Sec. 415(b)(1).
46
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Average adjusted earnings are then multiplied by a progressive
benefit formula to determine the worker’s primary insurance
amount (PIA). 51 The formula replaces a higher percentage of
average adjusted earnings with the lower one’s average earnings
so that the ratio of benefits to average earnings is higher for those
with low average earnings than for those with high average earnings. The benefit percentages (90%, 32%, and 15%) remain the
same each year, 52 while the dollar amounts, or “bend points,” 53
are increased by the rate of growth of the national average wage. 54
For those reaching age 62 in 2006, the formula replaces 90 percent
of the first $656 of AIME, plus 32 percent of AIME between $656
and $3,955, plus 15 percent of AIME above $3,779. 55
By indexing earnings and adjusting the bend points each year
for increases in the national average wage, the current Social
Security system ensures that benefits for each generation of workers
grow at the same rate as their wages grow, and the replacement
rate, that is, initial benefits as a percentage of workers’ careeraverage earnings, remains constant. 56 The Social Security Administration has estimated the replacement rate for low-wage workers
to be 55 percent, for average-wage workers to be 41 percent, and
for high-wage workers who have always earned the annual maximum taxable wage to be 27 percent. 57
Once initial benefits are calculated, they are adjusted for increases
in the consumer price index; that is, they are price indexed. 58 Price
51

42 U.S.C. Sec. 415(a).
42 U.S.C. Sec. 415(a)(1)(A).
53 “The amounts at which the PIA factors change are called bend points because
when the PIA factors are graphed against the AIME, the graph appears as three
lines joined at these points.” Purcell, supra note 47, at CRS-3 n. 5.
54 42 U.S.C. Sec. 415(a)(1)(B)(ii).
55 70 Fed. Reg. 61677 (Oct. 25, 2005) (establishing bend points for 2006).
56 See Purcell, supra note 47, at CRS-2 (“Under current law, benefits for each
generation of workers grow at the same rate as their wages grow. Consequently,
(1) the purchasing power of benefits rises from one generation of workers to the
next, and (2) the replacement rate — initial benefits as a percentage of workers’
career-average earnings — remains constant for each successive generation of
workers.”).
57 Id. at CRS-4–CRS-5.
58 42 U.S.C. Sec. 415(i).
52
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indexing ensures that initial benefits do not decline in value as
prices increase over time and that the retiree’s buying power
remains the same. 59
[b] Price Indexing Versus Wage Indexing
In 2001, President Bush’s Commission to Strengthen Social
Security proposed three alternative plans for reforming Social
Security. 60 Model 2, the model considered the most likely to resolve
permanently Social Security’s funding deficit, included, among
other changes, a shift from wage indexing to price indexing. 61
Specifically, Model 2 proposed that, beginning in 2009, each year
the PIA factors (90%, 32%, and 15%) be multiplied by the ratio
of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to the Average Wage Index in
successive years while earnings and the bend points remain indexed
for wage growth. 62 Due to increases in worker productivity, wages
tend to rise faster than prices, and price indexing is expected to
cause the PIA factors to decrease and the Social Security replacement rates to fall over time. 63
To illustrate, suppose that in one year prices grow by 2.8 percent
while wages grow by 3.9 percent, the long-term rates of growth
projected by the Social Security Administration. 64 Based on these
figures, each of the PIA factors would be multiplied by 1.028/1.039
or .989 that year. Assuming the Social Security Administration’s
59 Purcell, supra note 47, at CRS-1 (“Once enrolled in the program, beneficiaries’ Social Security checks increase each year at the same rate as the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) so that they do not decline in value as prices rise over time;
i.e., they are price indexed.”); Social Security Reform: Changes to the Benefit
Formula and Taxation of Benefits, Am. Acad. of Actuaries, Issue Brief 3 (Oct.
2005) (“Indexing benefits to changes in the CPI helps ensure that the buying power
of Social Security benefits remains the same after a worker begins receiving
benefits.”).
60 President’s Comm’n to Strengthen Soc. Sec., Strengthening Social Security
and Creating Personal Wealth for All Americans (Dec. 21, 2001).
61 Id. at 119.
62 Id. at 120 n.39. For a discussion of alternative price indexing models and
their effect on benefits and solvency of the Social Security system, see Andrew
G. Biggs, et al., Alternative Methods of Price Indexing Social Security: Implications
for Benefits and System Financing, NBER Working Paper No. 11406 (June 2005).
63 Purcell, supra note 47, at CRS-6.
64 See Board of Trustees of Fed. Old Age and Survivors Ins. and Disa. Tr. Funds,
2006 Annual Report 85, 86 (intermediate assumptions).
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projections are accurate and the long-term rate of price growth is
2.8 percent and wage growth is 3.9 percent, after 75 years of
multiplying the PIA factors by this ratio of price growth to wage
growth, the factors would fall from 90 percent, 32 percent and 15
percent to 40.5 percent, 14.4 percent, and 6.7 percent respectively. 65
Moreover, all three PIA factors would continue to fall into the
indefinite future. 66 Based on these projections, the replacement rate
for an average-wage earner would fall from 39 percent under current
law to 16 percent in 2080 under a price indexed system. 67
Because price indexing would decrease benefits so drastically,
it is expected to more than resolve solvency to the Social Security
system. Specifically, the Social Security Administration projects
that price indexing benefits would cut benefits by 2.07 percent of
taxable payroll 68 while the current projected shortfall is only 2.02
percent of taxable payroll. 69
[c] Progressive Price Indexing
Recognizing that over time price indexing could substantially
reduce benefits and have a particularly adverse effect on lowincome workers, 70 Robert Pozen proposed a progressive price
65

Purcell, supra note 47, at CRS-6.
Id.
67 Id. The replacement rate for an average-wage earner is expected to fall from
42% today to 39% in 2080 because the normal retirement age is scheduled to
increase from 66 to 67 under current law. Id.
68 Id.
69 Board of Trustees of Fed. Old Age and Survivors Ins. and Disa. Tr. Funds,
2006 Annual Report 2.
70 In testimony before the Ways and Means Committee, Pozen described the
rationale for his proposal as follows:
66

I believe that when Social Security was passed, there were no Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRA) or 401(k)s; there weren’t really even very many defined benefit
plans. Now, in 2004 alone, the tax revenue foregone for IRAs and 401(k)s was
roughly $55 billion; if we include all private retirement programs, it was $100 billion
in that year alone. Most of those tax subsidies go to high-wage and to some degree
middle-wage workers, and so, I believe in order to create neutral government support
among wage groups, we need to do more for low-wage workers in Social Security.
Very few of them have retirement programs like 401(k)s or IRAs and they are totally
dependent on Social Security.

Statement of Robert C. Pozen, supra note 43.
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indexing plan that would be effective for all those becoming eligible
for benefits in 2012 or later. 71 This plan would be implemented
through a three step process. The first step would be to compute
the percentage benefit reduction that would apply for a worker who
had earned the maximum taxable wage throughout the worker’s
career if all three of the PIA factors (90%, 32%, and 15%) were
fully price indexed. 72 Next, a new “bend point” in the Social
Security PIA formula would be created for low-wage workers,
which would be defined as workers with career earnings at or below
the 30th percentile of earnings, and benefits at or below this new
bend point would continue to be wage indexed. 73 Finally, the third
step of the process would be to calculate the percentage reduction
to the PIA factors above the new bend point (32% and 15%) that
would result in the same benefit reduction for workers who earned
the maximum taxable wage throughout their career as would have
applied if price indexing had applied to all workers. 74
Application of this three step process would result in reducing
benefits for workers who have earned the maximum taxable wage
base throughout their careers by the same percentage as they would
have been reduced if the benefit formula were fully price indexed
for all workers at all earnings level. 75 It would reduce benefits by
a smaller percentage for workers who have earned average wages
throughout their careers, and it would not reduce benefits at all for
71

For a detailed description of the plan, see Goss, supra note 43, at 2.
Goss, supra note 43, at 2 (“Begin by computing the percentage benefit reduction that would apply for the highest career-average earner becoming eligible for
a retired worker benefit in each year 2012 and later based on CPI-indexing the
PIA formula (as specified in Model 2 of the President’s Commission to Strengthen
Social Security).”).
73 Id. at 2 (“Then create a new “bend point” in the Social Security PIA formula
at the level of the career-average earnings of the retiree at the 30th percentile of
those becoming eligible for benefits in 2010, and wage index this bend point
forward like the two current bend points. This new bend point is estimated to be
28.6 percent of the way up from the current first bend point to the current second
bend point.”).
74 Id. at 2 (“Calculate the percentage reduction to the “PIA factors” (32 and
15) that applies beyond the new PIA bend point that will provide the benefit
reduction described above for the “maximum” earning reaching retirement
eligibility for each year 2012 and later.”).
75 Id. at 2 (“This proposal would replicate benefit reductions for the very highest
career average earners that are provided under a CPI-indexed benefit formula.”).
72
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workers with earnings at or below the 30th percentile of careeraverage earnings. 76 Thus, using current figures, workers who earn
the taxable maximum — $94,200 in 2006 77 — over their lifetime
would have their benefits calculated using price indexing, while
workers at or below the 30th percentile of career-average earnings
— about $20,000 today 78 — would have their benefits calculated
under the current formula, and those earning between $20,000 and
$94,200 would receive a benefit somewhere between the benefit
provided under current law and that provided under price indexing.
[d] Costs and Benefits of Progressive Price Indexing
Without a doubt, the greatest advantage of Pozen’s progressive
price indexing plan is its potential to reduce Social Security’s longterm deficit. According to Social Security Administration projections, this proposal “would reduce Social Security’s deficit by 1.4
percent of taxable payroll, or about 74 percent of the [then]
estimated 75-year deficit of 1.9 percent 79 of taxable payroll.” 80 A
76 Id. at 2 (“Benefit levels would be reduced to a lesser extent for workers with
lower career-average earnings, with no reduction for those at or below the 30th
percentile of career-average earnings (AIME).”).
77 See 70 Fed. Reg. 61677 (Oct. 25, 2005) (setting maximum taxable wage for
2006 at $94,200).
78 See Alicia H. Munnell and Mauricio Soto, What is Progressive Price Indexing?, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Just the Facts on
Retirement Issues 2 (No. 17 April 2005) (describing “the bottom 30 percent of
workers” as those making less than about $20,000 today).
79 In their 2006 report, the Social Security Trustees revised the estimated deficit
to 2.02 percent of taxable payroll. Board of Trustees of Fed. Old Age and Survivors
Ins. and Disa. Tr. Funds, 2006 Annual Report 2. The increase from 1.92 to 2.02
percent of taxable payroll is attributable to two factors: 1) the fact that the
projection period moved forward to include a year with a large deficit, and 2)
the fact that the assumed long-term interest rate was reduced from 3.0 to 2.9
percent, which increases the projected present value of projected deficits later in
the 75 year valuation period. Alicia H. Munnell, Social Security’s Financial
Outlook: The 2006 Update in Perspective, Boston College Center for Retirement
Research Issue Brief No. 46 4 (May 2006).
80 Purcell, supra note 47, at CRS-8. See also Statement of Pozen, supra note
43 (“[Progressive indexing] alone closes 70 percent of the long-term deficit of
Social Security, going from $3.8 trillion to $1.1 trillion . . .”); Thomas N. Bethell,
Future Shock: Is the latest Social Security proposal for indexing benefits
‘progressive’ or a body blow to the middle class, AARP Bulletin Online 2 (June
2005) (“Bush touts his plan as a responsible way to restore Social Security to long-
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second advantage of the proposal is that it would protect the benefits
of low-wage workers, who rely most heavily on Social Security
for their retirement income. 81
The plan, however, would not be costless. First, it would reduce
the benefits of average- and high-wage workers. For example,
according to calculations by Patrick Purcell of the Congressional
Research Service, assuming the Social Security Administration’s
predictions of price and wage growth of 2.8 percent per year and
3.9 percent per year are accurate, high-wage workers would receive
a benefit cut of 17.4 percent and average-wage workers would
receive a benefit cut of 13.3 percent by the year 2030. 82 Using the
same assumptions, by the year 2055, high-wage workers would
receive a benefit cut of 36.7 percent and average-wage workers
would receive a benefit cut of 28 percent, 83 and by the year 2080,
high-wage workers would receive a benefit cut of 51.5 percent and
average-wage workers would receive a benefit cut of 39.3 percent. 84
Moreover, if real wages were to grow faster, benefit cuts would
be even deeper. 85
Second, by reducing the benefits for high and average-wage
workers while retaining the inflation-adjusted growth of benefits
for low-wage workers, progressive price indexing would necessarily
flatten the Social Security benefit. For example, according to Jason
Furman of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, in 2045, a
high-wage worker, defined as a worker with earnings 60 percent
above those of the average worker, would only receive a benefit
that was 20 percent higher than that of an average wage worker,
term solvency, claiming it would close about 70 percent of the anticipated shortfall,
though some of these savings come from cutting disability and survivors benefits.
(Protecting the disabled means the Bush-Pozen plan would close only 50 percent
of the gap.)”), available at www.aarp.org/bulletin/socialsec/future_shock.html.
81 Social Security Administration, Income of the Aged Chartbook, 2000 22 (released Sept. 2004) (showing that Social Security benefits represent 83 percent of
aggregate income for elderly persons in the lowest quintile of income).
82 Purcell, supra note 47, at Tbl. 1 CRS-11.
83 Id. at Tbl. 2 CRS-12.
84 Id. at Tbl. 2 CRS-12. For additional discussion of estimates, see Jason Furman, An Analysis of Using “Progressive Price Indexing” to Set Social Security
Benefits 3–4 (May 2, 2005).
85 Id. at CRS-9.
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and by 2075, the high-wage worker’s benefit would only be 7
percent higher than that of the average wage worker. 86
Moreover, if implemented for a long enough period of time,
progressive price indexing would, in effect, eliminate Social Security’s progressive benefit formula because all workers with earnings
above the second bend point (representing the 30th percentile of
earnings) would receive the same flat benefit. The leveling of
benefits would result from the fact that the PIA factors applied to
the two higher earnings brackets would eventually be reduced to
zero. According to Purcell’s estimates assuming long-run real wage
growth of 1.1 percent per year, it would take about 100 years of
progressive price indexing for the PIA factors for the two higher
brackets to reach zero. 87 Thus, according to Furman, by 2100, the
majority of workers would receive a benefit of $22,500 per year,
which would only replace 9 percent of pre-retirement earnings for
a worker who earns the maximum taxable wage throughout his or
her career. 88
By flattening benefits, progressive price indexing threatens to
undermine public support for the Social Security system. 89 As
Robert Ball, long-time Commissioner of Social Security has said:
“[Progressive price indexing] really changes the entire philosophy of Social Security. Instead of partially replacing a worker’s
earnings, it gradually becomes a welfare program paying the
same flat benefit to everyone — while protecting only the poorest
30 percent. I can’t imagine people continuing to support it, once
they realize that the more they contribute, the less they’ll get.” 90
86

Furman, supra note 82, at 6.
Purcell, supra note 47, at CRS-10.
88 Furman, supra note 82, at 6.
89 See National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, Social
Security: “Progressive” Price Indexing and Middle-Class Benefit Cuts, Viewpoint
(May 2005), available at www.ncpss.org/news/archive/vp_priceindex/ (“Over time,
all workers would receive essentially the same poverty-level flat benefit, thus
converting the current earnings-based program into a welfare payment, and
seriously undermining public support for Social Security in the future.”).
90 Thomas N. Bethell, Future Shock: Is the latest Social Security proposal for
indexing benefits ‘progressive’ or a body blow to the middle class?, AARP Bulletin
Online, at 3, available at www.aarp.org/bulletin/socsec/future_shock.html.
87
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[3] Proposal to Fund Personal Retirement Accounts with
Social Security’s Annual Surpluses
The third proposal to receive considerable attention in 2005 was
a proposal to use Social Security’s annual surpluses, which are
projected to continue through 2016, 91 to fund voluntary personal
retirement accounts. On June 23, 2005, Senator Jim DeMint
introduced a bill, 92 entitled the “Stop the Raid on Social Security
Act of 2005,” that would permit the use of Social Security trust
fund surpluses to fund voluntary individual accounts. 93 On July 14,
2005, Representative Jim McCrery introduced a similar bill, 94
entitled the “Growing Real Ownership for Workers Act of 2005,”
before the House. 95
In introducing his bill, Senator DeMint declared that “it’s time
to stop the raid on Social Security. . . Stopping the raid will
strengthen Social Security and is the first step toward long-term
reform.” 96 Similarly, in introducing his bill, Representative McCrery said, “[S]pending Social Security funds on other programs
is wrong and must be stopped. . . . We should ensure that [Social
Security’s] surplus funds are spent on Social Security.” 97
Like President Bush’s proposal, both bills would create voluntary
personal retirement accounts. 98 Unlike the President’s proposal,
however, the bills would link funding of the accounts to the Social
Security Trust Fund’s annual surpluses. 99 Both bills would require
91

2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds 2.
92

S. 1302, 109th Cong. (2005).

93

151 Cong. Rec. S27296-01 (June 23, 2005).

94

H. R. 3304, 109th Cong. (2005).

95

H. R. 3304, 109th Cong. (2005).

96

151 Cong. Rec. S7296-01 (June 23, 2005).

97

151 Cong. Rec. E1499-03 (July 14, 2005).

98

See S. 1302, Sec. 251, 109th Cong. (2005). The House bill refers to the accounts as “GROW accounts” rather than personal retirement accounts. H. R. 3304,
Sec. 255, 109th Cong. (2005).
99

See S. 1302, Sec. 254, 109th Cong. (2005). H. R. 3304, Sec. 254, 109th Cong.
(2005).
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that plan assets initially be invested in U.S. Treasury bonds, but
provide that alternative investments would later be available. 100
Because both bills provide for the creation of voluntary personal
retirement accounts, they are generally subject to the same advantages and disadvantages as the President’s proposal. 101 They would,
however, involve an additional cost. Because the program would
only continue so long as the Social Security system runs a surplus,
administrative costs for running the program for such a relatively
short period time could result in the administrative costs outweighing any benefits. Of course, the proponents hope that once they have
opened the door to individual accounts, they would continue beyond
2016 or whenever Social Security ceases to run a surplus. 102
In addition, by linking the funding of the accounts to the annual
surpluses, they open a new issue in the Social Security debate —
the trust fund. 103 While the Republican sponsors of these bills claim
that they “would stop the raid” on Social Security’s trust fund
surplus, Democrats charge that they would either “‘double count’
assets or force the government to borrow more in the international
debt market and thus raise debt and interest costs.” 104 They claim
that McCrery’s bill would double count because the accounts would
initially be invested in Treasury securities 105 while the trust fund
100

See S. 1302, Sec. 255, 109th Cong. (2005) (providing for alternative investments beginning in 2008); H. R. 3304, Sec. 256(c), 109th Cong. (2005) (alternative
investments would be available “[b]eginning at such time as the Board implements
an investment options plan to provide additional and alternative investment
options”).
101 See Section 8.02[1], supra.
102 Cf. Elizabeth Grover, Accounts-Only Bill Best Route, GOP Senate Account
Proponents Say, 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 2055, 2055 (September 27, 2005)
(“Democrats in Congress oppose both measures on grounds that they would swell
the public debt and represent a back-door effort at ultimately creating far bigger
payroll tax-financed accounts along the lines envisioned by the Bush administration.”).
103 Jonathan Nicholson, Shadowy Social Security Surplus Takes Central Role
in Retirement Overhaul Debate, 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 1503 (July 5, 2005)
(“With the introduction of two bills that would use the Social Security trust fund
surplus to set up personal investment accounts, and resulting criticism from
Democrats that such an approach will increase the nation’s debt, the trust fund
surplus is fast becoming part of the Social Security debate.”).
104 Id. at 1503.
105 H. R. 3304, Sec. 256(c), 109th Cong. (2005).
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would also be credited with the money. 106 Described by Senator
DeMint as “an honest accounting bill,” 107 DeMint’s bill also
requires that the accounts initially be invested in Treasury securities, 108 but does not credit the trust fund with the money. The plan
does, however, contemplate the government using general revenues
to maintain Social Security’s solvency, 109 which Democrats contend will force the government to borrow more money. 110 Bob
Bixby, executive director of the Concord Coalition, an anti-budget
deficit group, has described DeMint’s plan “an incomplete proposal,” more budget reform than Social Security reform. 111
Senator DeMint and Senator Santorum tried to bring DeMint’s
bill to the floor in November but failed to do so. 112
§ 8.03

WHY SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM FAILED IN
2005

Why did Social Security reform, which started with such a
flourish at the beginning of 2005, end with a whimper by the close
of 2005? Commentators and legislators have offered a variety of
explanations.
106 Nicholson, supra note 3, at 1503 (“The accounts would be invested initially
in Treasury securities, but the trust fund would also be credited with the money,
leading Democrats to charge the plan is ‘double counting.”’). See also Jason
Furman and Robert Greenstein, The DeMint and McCrery Social Security Plans
2 (July 19, 2005) (contending that McCrery plan would “double count”), available
at www.cbpp.org/6-22-05socsec.htm.
107 Elizabeth Grover, Santorum, DeMint Make Last Effort to Revive Social Security Debate in 2005, BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 2534, 2534 (Nov. 22, 2005).
108 S. 1302, Sec. 255, 109th Cong. (2005).
109 S. 1302, Sec. 254(b)(4), 109th Cong. (2005).
110 Nicholson, supra note 3, at 1503 (July 5, 2005) (“With the introduction of
two bills that would use the Social Security trust fund surplus to set up personal
investment accounts, and resulting criticism from Democrats that such an approach
will increase the nation’s debt, the trust fund surplus is fast becoming part of the
Social Security debate.”).
111 Id. (“With the introduction of two bills that would use the Social Security
trust fund surplus to set up personal investment accounts, and resulting criticism
from Democrats that such an approach will increase the nation’s debt, the trust
fund surplus is fast becoming part of the Social Security debate.”).
112 Grover, supra note 107, at 2534; 151 Cong. Rec. S12828-02 (November
15, 2005).
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Some commentators attribute President Bush’s failure to reform
Social Security to the fact that individual accounts are politically
unacceptable. 113 For example, according to a Washington Post
editorial:
The Bush team should accept that, as a political matter, it was
a mistake to insist that personal accounts be part of reform. These
accounts have advantages, especially for less well-off workers
who do not already own stocks: They offer a good chance, though
not a guarantee, of enhancing retirement by capturing healthy
returns from the stock market. But Mr. Bush failed to convince
Congress or the nation of this advantage, in part because the
economic uncertainty engendered by technology and globalization creates a preference for federally guaranteed benefits. Given
the political capital that the newly elected president invested in
personal accounts, his failure suggests that they are a nonstarter. 114
Not all supporters of individual accounts, however, are willing
to concede that individual accounts are politically unattainable.
Rather, some individual account proponents blame President Bush
and his tactics for the failure to achieve Social Security reform in
2005. For example, Republican Senator Clay Shaw notes that
President Bush never offered a detailed plan of his own and thus
could not unite Republicans behind a single plan. According to
Shaw, “You had too many people going off in too many different
directions and the whole while the Democrats just trying to sink
113

Cf. Priya D. Nair, Bush Acknowledges ‘Diminished Appetite’ For Addressing
Social Security in Short-Term, 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 2161, 2162 (Oct. 11,
2005) (noting that on October 4, 2005, the National Committee to Preserve Social
Security and Medicare (NCPSSM) said that it planned to deliver about 1.5 million
petitions expressing opposition to individual accounts. The President of NCPSSM
claims the petitions demonstrate “the overwhelming opposition from Americans
opposed to Social Security private accounts . . . It’s time the private account
proponents in Congress listen to what voters are saying . . . no private accounts,
not today, not next year, and not ever.”); Elizabeth Grover, Bush Huddles With
Commission As Revision Plan’s Foes Claim Win, BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 2054,
2054 (Sept. 27, 2005) (noting that “the union-backed group and top opponent of
Bush’s Social Security proposal — Americans United to Protect Social Security
— said it is close to declaring victory on the issue”).
114 Editorial, A Deal on Social Security, Washington Post A18 (Oct. 31, 2005).
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the whole idea of reform.” 115 Republican Senators Gordon Smith
and Olympia Snowe blame President Bush for his failure to seek
Democratic participation before outlining a plan for individual
accounts. 116 Republican Senator Rick Santorum suggests that the
failure may lie in the fact that President Bush “led with the issue
of Social Security” during his 2004 re-election campaign and then
took a “two to three month hiatus” from talking about Social
Security reform before returning to it during his State of the Union
address in February 2005. “Bush’s foes used that hiatus to generate
a huge campaign aimed at fighting the White House’s Social
Security proposal” 117 The Cato Institute contends that the Bush
administration used the wrong approach to sell individual accounts;
the debate should have focused on ownership and inheritability of
individual accounts rather than solvency. 118
Kevin Hassett, in an article for Bloomberg.com, suggests that
Social Security reform failed because President Bush separated
Social Security reform from other legislative initiatives which made
reform politically impractical:
From the outset, many in Congress believed Social Security
reform could only be achieved if it were included in a broad taxreform package, or some other, more general legislative action.
Only then would the horse traders have enough room to buy the
votes needed to push the plan through. By insisting on the
separation of Social Security and other initiatives (especially tax
reform), the president tied the hands of allies.
It’s easy for the economists on the Council of Economic Advisers
to outline Social Security changes; crafting reforms that can
become law requires legislative expertise. The men and women
115

Alex Wayne and Martha Angle, Bush Sees Less Appetite for Social Security
Overhaul; Lawmakers Point to the Menu, Congressional Quarterly Today 12 (Oct.
5, 2005).
116 Id. See also Elizabeth Grover, Sen. Voinovich Proposes Lockbox For Social
Security, Other Trust Funds, 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 2056, 2056 (Sept. 27,
2005) (noting that Republican Senator Voinovich said that Social Security reform
“may have been doomed from the beginning because it wasn’t done on a bipartisan
basis”).
117 Elizabeth Grover, Accounts-Only Bill Best Route, GOP Senate Account Proponents Say, 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 2055, 2055 (Sept. 27, 2005).
118 New Cato Radio Advertisements Aim To Shift Gears in Debate Over Accounts, 32 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 834, 834 (April 12, 2005)
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in Congress are the only ones with this expertise. Cutting them
out of the process meant that the president went forward with
a plan and tactical strategy that turned out to be legislatively
impractical. 119
In a recent article, Reforming Retirement Systems: Why the
French Have Succeeded When Americans Have Not, 120 I examined
why the French were able to significantly reform their retirement
system in 2003 while the American Social Security system has
remained virtually unchanged since 1983. 121 In that article, I
offered three principle reasons why the French were able to reform
their system in 2003: First, the system was facing serious short-term
and long-term funding difficulties, and the public was wellinformed about the funding difficulties as well as the possible means
of reform. 122 Second, the government initiated and developed the
reform through a very unique and public process of debate, consultation, and negotiation. It intentionally and repeatedly consulted
with the trade union organizations and ultimately reached an accord
with two trade union federations, the French Democratic Federation
of Labor (Confédération français démocratique du travail (CFDT))
and the French Confederation of Professional and Managerial StaffGeneral Confederation of Professional and Managerial Staff (Confédération français de l’encadrement-Confédération générale des
cadres (CFE-CGC)), prior to introducing the reform before the
parliament. 123 Finally, Prime Minister Raffarin was absolutely and
incontrovertibly committed to reform. He was willing to stake the
credibility of his government on the reform and hold firm despite
public protests and demonstrations. 124
Because Congress does not typically negotiate with labor unions
before introducing or enacting legislation in the United States, only
119 Kevin Hassett, How Bush’s Social Security Reform Died (Aug. 1, 2005),
available at www.aei.org/publication22926.
120 Kathryn L. Moore, Reforming Retirement Systems: Why the French Have
Succeeded When Americans Have Not, 22 Ariz. J. of Comp. & Int’l. Law 251
(2005).
121 There have been modest amendments to the American Social Security system since 1983, but the last major reform was enacted in 1983. See Social Security
Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
122 Moore, supra note 120, at 270–71.
123 Id. at 272–76.
124 Id. at 277–80.
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two of the three reasons pointing to the success of the French reform
in 2003 are of relevance in the United States: (1) public education
and (2) political commitment. At first blush, it seems that President
Bush should have been successful in his effort to reform Social
Security. He spent a great deal of time and energy educating the
public about Social Security’s long-term deficit. In addition, he
displayed more political commitment to changing Social Security
than we have seen in many years. 125 Why then did he fail?
First, despite President Bush’s attempt to portray Social Security’s funding difficulties as an imminent crisis, 126 the system’s
funding difficulties are not immediate but long-term in nature. 127
Historically, the United States has only acted to address Social
Security’s financing problems when they have been immediate and
short-term. 128
Second, and more importantly, the keystone of President Bush’s
reform proposal, the creation of individual accounts, 129 would do
absolutely nothing to resolve Social Security’s funding problems.
Even the White House recognizes that personal security accounts
would not solve the deficit. 130 Indeed, depending on how they are
125

See id., at 283–88 (describing lack of political commitment in recent years).
Cf. Jeff Webb, On Social Security, residents deserve Brown-Waite’s ear,
St. Petersburg Times 2, 2005 WLNR 6667320 (April 28, 2005) (“President Bush
is wrapping up a months long campaign to persuade Americans that the [Social
Security] system is in crisis and promote his plan to establish private investment
accounts for taxpayers.”); Ann McFeatters, No Meeting of Minds Both Sides Fully
Mobilized as Debate Begins on Overhauling Social Security, Pitt. Post-Gazette
A1, 2005 WLNR 6560596 (April 27, 2005) (“In a sold-out speech at the National
Press Club, Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., accused Bush of a ‘manufactured panic’
in portraying Social Security as in a state of crisis.”).
127 According to the Social Security Trustees, contributions to Social Security
will exceed benefits paid from the system until 2017, and the trust fund will not
be exhausted until 2040. Board of Trustees of Fed. Old Age and Survivors Ins.
and Disa. Tr. Funds, 2006 Annual Report 2.
128 Moore, supra note 120, at 286–88.
129 See Steven Thomma and Ron Hutchenson, Bush proposes new benefits system; Wants Social Security to favor the poorest retirees, Lexington Herald-Leader
A1, A12 (April 29, 2005) (noting that at President Bush’s prime time news
conference, he insisted anew that any Social Security reform plan include private
accounts).
130 In a private White House memo to conservative allies, Peter Wehner, President Bush’s director of strategic initiatives declared, “[w]e simply cannot solve
126
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funded, personal security accounts, could exacerbate Social Security’s funding difficulties rather than resolve them because personal
security accounts would impose transition of costs of $1 to $2
trillion or more. 131 Although President Bush did endorse progressive price indexing, 132 which would have addressed Social Security’s solvency issues, he did not expend the same political capital
on promoting progressive price indexing as he did on personal
accounts. Instead, he focused most of his efforts on promoting
personal accounts which would not solve Social Security’s longterm funding deficit.
§ 8.04

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM

In the short term, the prospect for Social Security reform appears
bleak. 133 Although President Bush has claimed that Social Security
reform is never off the table for him, 134 Social Security reform
clearly appears to have been moved to the back burner. 135 Despite
the Social Security problem with Personal Retirement Accounts alone. If the goal
is permanent solvency and sustainability — as we believe it should be — then
Personal Retirement Accounts, for all their virtues, are insufficient to that task.”
See Jackie Calmes, White House Memo argues for Social Security Cuts; Note Aims
at GOP Backers Of Private Accounts Alone; Threat to Party’s Majority?, Wall
St. J. A1 (Jan. 6, 2005).
131 See id. (describing transition costs as equal to $1 to $2 trillion); Social Security Plan Backed, Deseret News B01, 2005 WLNR 3988642 (March 15, 2005)
(stating that transition costs “are expected to be $1.3 trillion over the next 10 years
and $3 trillion to $4 trillion in the 10 years after that”).
132 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
133 Editorial, A Deal on Social Security, Washington Post A18 (Oct. 31, 2005)
(declaring that “the Bush Administration’s declining fortunes have buried the
prospect of Social Security reform”); Kevin A. Hassett, How President Bush’s
Social Security Reform Died (Aug. 1, 2005) (announcing “Social Security reform
is dead.”), available at www.aei.org/publication22926.
134 Elizabeth Grover, Bush Acknowledges “Diminished Appetite” For Addressing Social Security in Short-Term, BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 2161, 2162 (Oct.
11, 2005) (quoting the President: “Social Security, for me, is never off. It’s a longterm problem that’s going to need to be addressed. When the appetite to address
it is — you know, that’s going to be up to the members of Congress.”).
135 Edwin Chen and Joel Havemann, Social Security plan withering, Bush Says:
Cites More Urgent Needs of Gulf Area, Lexington Herald-Leader A-8 (Oct. 5,
2005) (noting that “in enumerating his short-term priorities at a nearly hourlong
news conference in the White House Rose Garden, the president mentioned only
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its prominence in the President’s 2005 State of the Union address,
Social Security reform played a much more modest role in his 2006
State of the Union address. Rather than promoting any particular
reform, the President simply called for the creation of yet another
commission 136 “to examine the full impact of baby boom retirements on Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid.” 137
The prospect for reform appears particularly bleak for 2006
because it is an election year. It seems highly unlikely that Congress
would tackle such a controversial issue in an election year. 138
Indeed, in February 2006, a House Republican leadership aide said,
“[I]t would be difficult for us to tackle this [Social Security reform]
in a partisan election atmosphere.” 139 Similarly, on November 15,
2005, Senate Finance Committee Chair, Charles Grassley, announced at a meeting before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that
he was “‘very pessimistic’ about the chances for moving Social
Security overhaul through Congress any time soon” and suggested
the war on terror and the hurricane reconstruction” and did not include Social
Security reform).
136 Over the last decade or so, there have been three different bipartisan commissions to study entitlements, “the Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax
Reform (created in 1994), the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of
Medicare (1997), and the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security
(2001), along with any number of think tank-sponsored reform panels.” Editorial,
Dismantling Social Security; Rejected Plan Still Lives, Philadelphia Inquirer A10
(Feb. 14, 2006).
137

Jack Z. Smith, Presidential Wheel-Spinning on Entitlements, Augusta
Chronicle A05 (March 8, 2006) (“Bush proposed in his Jan. 31 State of the Union
speech that Congress join him ‘in creating a commission to examine the full impact
of baby boom retirements on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.”’).
138 Id. (“It’s a safe bet that meaningful solutions to the long-term funding dilemmas facing Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will have to be implemented
by some future administration and Congress that are more open to true bipartisan
cooperation and less ideologically poloarized.”); Chen and Havemann, supra note
1335 at A-8 (Oct. 5, 2005) (“Some lawmakers, such as Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb.,
have expressed doubt that Congress in an election year would be able to summon
the political wherewithal to take on such a hot-button issue. Bush said as much
yesterday, noting that such action called for ‘political courage.”’).
139

Amy Fagan, Critics cry fould in Bush Social Security maneuver Cost of president’s plan for personal accounts is in ‘07 budget, Washington Times A02 (Feb.
12, 2006).
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that reform may not be possible until 2009. 140 He noted that he
had held 15 committee meetings on Social Security reform and was
still unable to reach consensus among the Republicans on the Senate
Finance Committee panel. 141
Although the prospect for Social Security reform in the shortterm is dim, Social Security reform is inevitable in the long run.
The Social Security Trustees project that by 2017, the Social
Security system will begin collecting less in contributions than it
owes in benefits, and by 2040, the Trust Fund will be exhausted. 142
At that point in time, absent an intervening change in the law, the
system will only be able to pay 74 percent of promised annual
benefits, and by 2080, the system will only be able to pay 70 percent
of promised annual benefits. 143
While Social Security’s long-term financial difficulties are not
insignificant, it is important to put the magnitude of the difficulties
in perspective. As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
Social Security outlays are projected to increase from 4.3 percent
of GDP today to 6.2 percent of GDP in 2030, and 6.3 percent of
GDP in 2080. 144 Medicare’s long-term financing difficulties, in
contrast, are “more serious and intractable.” 145
According to the Medicare Trustees:
The financial outlook for the Medicare program continues to raise
serious concerns . . . Total Medicare expenditures were $336
billion in 2005 and are expected to increase in future years at
a faster pace than either workers’ earnings or the economy
overall. As a percentage of GDP, expenditures are projected to
increase from 2.7 percent in 2005 to 11.0 percent by 2080 (based
140

Elizabeth Grover and Kurt Ritterpusch, Grassley Says Social Security Reform Adoption May Not Be Possible Until 2009, BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 2479,
2479 (Nov. 15, 2005).
141 Id.
142 Board of Trustees of Fed. Old Age and Survivors Ins. and Disa. Tr. Funds,
2006 Annual Report 2.
143 Id. at 8.
144 Board of Trustees of Fed. Old Age and Survivors Ins. and Disa. Tr. Funds,
2006 Annual Report 3.
145 Lawrence Lokken, A Tax Lawyer’s Observations on Scary Numbers, Politics, and Irresponsibility: A Commentary on Shaviro’s Reckless Disregard, 45 B.C.
L. Rev. 1335, 1343 (2004).
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on our intermediate set of assumptions) . . . . [G]rowth of this
magnitude, if realized, would . . . substantially increase the
strain on the nation’s workers, Medicare beneficiaries, and the
Federal Budget. 146
Put another way, Social Security’s long-term deficit is estimated
to be 2.02 percent of taxable payroll. 147 Somewhat simplified, 148
that means that Social Security’s 75-year deficit could be solved
if the Social Security payroll tax were increased tomorrow by about
2 percentage points – 1 percentage point each for the employee and
the employer. 149 For an employee earning the maximum taxable
wage of $94,200 in 2006, such an increase would cost the employee
and the employer each about $940 in 2006. Although it might be
possible to solve Social Security’s 75-year projected deficit by
increasing the payroll tax by 2 percentage points tomorrow, there
is no serious proposal before Congress to increase the payroll tax
by 2 percentage points tomorrow. Thus, that is unlikely to happen.
Nevertheless, predicting the form Social Security reform will
ultimately take is difficult. As a critic of partial privatization of
Social Security, 150 I would love to say that the personal account
movement is dead and buried. Unfortunately, however, the proponents of individual accounts are a tenacious lot. For example,
although President Bush may have given the impression that he had
146 Boards of Trustees of Fed. Hosp. Ins. and Fed. Supp. Med. Ins. Tr. Funds,
2006 Annual Report 3–4.
147 Board of Trustees of Fed. Old Age and Survivors Ins. and Disa. Tr. Funds,
2006 Annual Report 2.
148 Social Security’s financing problem is somewhat more complicated than just
described. Under current law, the tax rate is fixed while costs are rising. This pattern
produces surpluses now and large deficits in the future. As a result of this profile,
for each year the projection period moves forward, another year with a large deficit
is added to the 75-year deficit. Assuming nothing else changes, this phenomenon
will sightly increase the 75-year deficit each year (.07 percent of taxable payroll
with today’s deficits).
Alicia Munnell, Social Security’s Financial Outlook: The 2006 Update in
Perspective, Boston College Center for Retirement Research Issue Brief 46, at 3
(May 2006).
149 Id. at 3.
150 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6; Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of
Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income
Workers, 65 Missouri L. Rev. 341 (2000); Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of
Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 Temple L. Rev. 131 (1998).
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conceded defeat in the battle for personal accounts when he did
not even mention them in his 2006 State of the Union address, he
clearly has not abandoned them. A few days after he gave his 2006
State of the Union address, President Bush submitted his 2007
federal budget. Oblivious to the steadily eroding public support for
individual accounts and their inability to close the fiscal gap,
President Bush included in his proposed budget costs of $712 billion
over 10 years to fund Social Security Personal Accounts beginning
in 2010. 151
Similarly, Senator DeMint has not forsaken his proposal to fund
individual accounts with the Social Security surplus. 152 On March
16, 2006, DeMint offered an amendment, Amendment No. 3087,
to the budget bill. 153 Although he claimed that his amendment
would do “nothing to change Social Security — no privatization,
no stock market investment,” Sec. 3 of the amendment expressly
“provid[es] the option to voluntarily obtain legally binding ownership of at least some portion of each participant’s benefits.” 154 The
proposal was defeated in the Senate by a 53-46 vote. 155
Whether or not partial privatization proponents are ultimately
successful, it is clear that Social Security reform must include either
benefit cuts or increased taxes or some combination of the two to
address Social Security’s long-term deficit. 156 There is simply no
magic rabbit, no costless solution to solving Social Security’s long
term deficit.
151

Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007. Table S-6 p.

321.
152 152 Cong. Rec. S2241-01 (March 16, 2006); see also Amy Fagan, Social
Security reform rejected; Democrats make it an issue, Washington Times A04
(March 20, 2006) (discussing proposed amendment).
153 152 Cong. Rec. S2241-01 (March 16, 2006).
154 152 Cong. Rec. S2241-01 (March 16, 2006).
155 152 Cong. Rec. S2241-01 (March 16, 2006). Democratic Senator Max Baucus
is reported to have said, “Any time there’s an opportunity to privatize Social
Security, they’ll take it . . . [The DeMint proposal was] evidence today that they’re
going to stick with it.” Fagan, supra note 139, at A04.
156 U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, Social Security: Restoring Long-Term Solvency Will
Require Difficult Choices 9 (1998) (“No matter what shape Social Security reform
takes, restoring long-term solvency will require some combination of benefit
reductions and revenue increases.”).
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Benefit cuts and increased taxes may take a variety of forms. 157
For example, on March 20, 2006, Senator Robert Bennett introduced a bill, “The Sustainable Solvency First for Social Security
Act,” 158 that would cut benefits in two ways. First, it would
introduce progressive price indexing beginning in 2012. 159 Second,
it would accelerate the current law’s scheduled increase in the
normal retirement age from 66 to 67 and index the normal retirement age to increases in life expectancy. 160 According to Bennett,
the Social Security Administration’s office has certified that his plan
would bring solvency to the Social Security system. 161
Robert Ball, Commissioner of Social Security under Presidents
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, has offered a three part plan to
restore solvency to the Social Security system. 162 Unlike Bennett’s
proposal, Ball’s proposal would not include any benefit cuts.
Instead, it would restore solvency to the system solely by increasing
revenue to the system. Ball offers the following justification for
limiting changes to those that increase income:
[B]enefits are already being cut in two significant ways — first
by changing the retirement age, which alters the benefit formula
in a way that has the effect of an across-the-board benefit cut,
and second by the ongoing deduction of Medicare premiums from
Social Security benefits. So a truly balanced solution to the longterm shortfall must call for more income, not more benefit cuts.
157 For a discussion of the range of possible options, see Virgina Reno and Joni
Lavery, Options to Balance Social Security Funds over the Next 75 Years, National
Academy of Social Insurance Social Security Brief No. 18 (Feb. 2005), and U.S.
Gen. Acct. Off., Social Security: Different Approaches for Addressing Program
Solvency (1998).
158 S. 2427, 109th Cong. (2006).
159 S. 2427, 109th Cong., Sec. 2 (2006).
160 S. 2427, Sec. 3, 109th Cong. (2006). For an analysis of the costs and benefits
of increasing the normal retirement age, see Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social
Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the Costs and Benefits, 33 Ariz. St. L. J. 543
(2001).
161 Michael W. Wyand, Sen. Bennett Introduces Reform Bill, “Under No Illusion” It Will Pass, He Says, 33 BNA Pens. & Bene. Rptr. 714, 714 (March 21,
2006).
162 Robert M. Ball, The Social Security Protection Plan: How we can cope —
calmly — with the system’s long-term shortfall (Jan. 2006). For a more detailed
discussion of this plan plus three additional elements, see Nancy J. Altman, The
Battle for Social Security: From FDR’s Vision to Bush’s Gamble 297–309 (2005).
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We simply can’t afford to reduce the protection that Social
Security currently provides. Social Security benefits are the major
source of support for two out of every three beneficiaries and
are vitally important to nearly all the rest. Benefit levels need
to be maintained or even improved, particularly in light of the
increasingly uncertain future faced by private pension plans —
with traditional defined-benefit plans (many of them underfunded) now covering only about 20 percent of the private-sector
workforce, and with the 401(k) individual savings plans that are
to some extent replacing the traditional plans subject to the
vagaries of individual investment experience and vulnerable to
being cashed out before retirement. 163
The first part of his three part plan consists of gradually increasing the maximum earnings base until it reaches 90 percent of
earnings. 164 In the second part of his plan, Ball proposes to dedicate
the estate tax to funding Social Security beginning in 2010. 165 The
third element of Ball’s plan consists of investing a portion of the
Social Security surplus in equities. 166
Unlike Bennett and Ball who propose to restore solvency to
Social Security solely by reducing benefits or increasing taxes,
economists Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag have created a sophisticated three-part proposal that includes a variety of benefit reductions and revenue increases. 167 They believe that “the competing
demands of ensuring adequate retirement income for all Americans,
restoring long-term balance to Social Security, protecting the
program’s core social insurance functions, avoiding massive increases in payroll tax rates, and balancing burdens fairly across
future workers and retirees require a combination of benefit and
tax changes.” 168 Their proposed changes are designed to address
the three sources of Social Security’s long-term deficit: (1) increasing life expectancy; 169 (2) increased earnings inequality which has
163

Ball, supra note 162, at 7–8.
Id. at 2.
165 Id. at 3.
166 Id. at 4.
167 Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag, Saving Social Security 79 (2004).
168 Id. at 80.
169 The first element of their proposal, which is designed to address the part
164
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led to a much larger fraction of aggregate earnings not being subject
to payroll taxes; 170 and (3) Social Security’s legacy debt which
arises from the fact that the system paid far more in benefits to
the early generations of retirees than they contributed to the
system. 171
Unfortunately, I am unable to predict which, if any, of these
proposals will be successful. I can, however, say with absolute
certainty that Social Security reform will require that difficult
choices be made, and that costs be imposed on some, if not all,
of Social Security participants and beneficiaries.
Difficult though those choices may be, they are not as difficult
as the choices faced by Medicare. Social Security’s long-term
financing difficulties can be solved in any number of ways with
sufficient political will. Partial privatization, however, is not one
of the ways in which Social Security’s financial difficulties can be
solved. Partial privatization would only exacerbate the system’s
current long-term deficit.
of Social Security’s imbalance that is attributable to increasing life expectancy,
would automatically adjust Social Security benefits and taxes based on contemporaneous projections of life expectancy. Id. at 82. Specifically, each year the Social
Security Administration would calculate the net cost to Social Security imposed
by any increase in life expectancy in the past year for a typical worker at the normal
retirement age. Id. at 83. Half of the “net cost of increased life expectancy” would
be offset by a reduction in benefits while the other half would be reflected in an
increase in the tax rate. Id. at 83.
170

The second element of their plan, which is designed to address the increased
earnings inequality, consists of gradually increasing the maximum earnings base
until it reaches 87 percent of earnings and adjusting the benefit formula to increase
the system’s progressivity. Id. at 85–86. Specifically, they would gradually reduce
the third PIA factor (currently equal to 15%) until it reaches 10%. Id. at 87.
171

The third and final part of their proposal consists of three changes to address
Social Security’s legacy costs. Id. at 88. First, they propose to extend Social
Security coverage to all state and local government employees. Id. at 90. Second,
they propose a tax on earnings above the maximum taxable wage base that would
begin at 3 percent. Id. at 92. Finally, they propose a universal legacy charge on
payroll taxes and benefits beginning in 2023. “The benefit adjustment would reduce
initial benefits for newly eligible beneficiaries by 0.31 percent for each year after
2022[, and t]he revenue adjustment would raise the payroll tax rate by 85 percent
of the benefit reduction percentage from this component of the plan.” Id. at 93.
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